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一、中文摘要
本文利用對偶技術，建立一個考
慮全球污染協定的二國、二財一般均衡
模型，以探討商品及污染排放權的貿易
自由化，對南北國社會福利與污染排放
水準的影響。本文著重在北國進口需求
的價格彈性如何透過對實質所得的作
用，進而影響污染排放水準。我們証明
商品貿易自由化可以在某些條件下，減
少世界污染水準，降低南國社會福利及
改善北國福利水準。再者，允許污染排
放權的國際貿易，可能會提高世界污染
排放水準且對南國有利，至於其對北國
福利的影響則不確定。
關鍵詞：南北貿易，貿易自由化，跨國
污染，京都議定書
Abstract
By introducing the global pollution
agreement, this paper develops a two-
country, two-good, general-equilibrium
model with a dual approach to examine
the impacts of trade liberalization in
commodities and in pollution permits on
pollution levels and welfare. The
paper’s focus is on how the price elasticity
of Northern import demand affects
pollution levels through the real income
effect. It shows that trade liberalization
in commodities may reduce worldwide
pollution levels, worsen Southern welfare,
and improve Northern welfare under a set
of stringent conditions.  Moreover,
allowing pollution permits to be tradable
internationally may increase worldwide
pollution levels.  This paper also shows
that the South will benefit from the system
of carbon trading, whereas its impact on
Northern welfare is ambiguous.
Key Words: North-South trade, trade
liberalization, transboundary pollution,
Kyoto Protocol
二、緣由與目的
There has been a growing interest
on the linkage between international trade
and the environment in recent years.
Two categories of articles can be
classified based on the nature of pollution.
One treats pollution as a pure public bad:
all countries are equally exposed to a
given unit of pollution, regardless of its
source; see Copeland and Taylor (1995),
Copeland (1996), Ludema and Wooton
(1994), Markusen (1975), Perroni and
Wigle (1994). The other treats it as a
local public bad: pollution damage is
confined to the emitting country; see
Chichilnisky (1994), Copeland and Taylor
(1994), Copeland (1994).
In particular, Copeland and Taylor
(1995) develop a static two-country
general-equilibrium model with a
2continuum of goods differing in their
pollution intensity of production.
Assuming that pollution is a pure public
bad, they obtain the following results.
Free trade raises worldwide pollution
levels if income differs substantially
across countries.  Northern countries
lose but Southern countries gain from
trade, if trade equalizes factor prices.
International trade in pollution permits
can lower worldwide pollution levels
even when the government’s supply of
permits is unrestricted.  In their paper,
Copeland and Taylor assume that both
Northern and Southern governments
choose their own pollution target
efficiently, however, this assumption may
not be fulfilled if we consider the global
pollution agreement signed just recently.
During December 1997, a major
world conference took place in Kyoto,
Japan, paving the way forward for
environmental stability for years to come.
In the end, the conference concluded a
global pollution agreement, the Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate
Change, hereinafter referred to as the
Kyoto Protocol.  As quoted in the Kyoto
Protocol, 38 industrialized countries were
required to reduce their greenhouse
emissions by an average of 5 percent from
1990 levels by between 2008 and 2012.
However, many developing countries are
allowed to set their own voluntary
reduction targets. Moreover, some
countries suggest that countries who do
not meet their own emissions targets can
strike deals with nations that do better
than required and buy their excess quota:
a process now known as “carbon trading.”
Thus, it should be reasonable to assume
that the pollution permits supplied in the
North are fixed at a given level, while
those in the South are determined by an
efficient condition.
As a result of the Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations,
participating nations agreed to open
markets to promote trade. It is
noteworthy that it is quotas rather than
tariffs which constitute a major constraint
on imports by developing countries.
Moreover, trade negotiations between the
North and South in recent years have
shifted away from focusing on restricting
Southern firms’ access to Northern
markets as a means of expanding
Northern firms’ access to Southern
markets.  This kind of trade policy was
dubbed voluntary import expansion (VIE)
by Bhagwati (1987).  A VIE agreement
sets a target level or target share for
import sales in a domestic market.
Hence, we use a relaxation in Southern
import quotas to represent trade
liberalization in commodities.
Introducing the global pollution
agreement, this paper’s purpose is to
examine the impacts of trade
liberalization in commodities and in
pollution permits on pollution levels and
welfare by using a two-country, two-good,
general-equilibrium model with a dual
approach.  This model differs from that
of Copeland and Taylor (1995) in two
respects.  Firstly, by introducing the
global pollution agreement, Northern
pollution levels are regulated at five
percent below the levels in the year 1990
for each Northern country.  Thus, the
changes in worldwide pollution levels
depend solely on the changes in Southern
pollution levels.  Secondly, by using a
general-equilibrium model with a dual
approach, we can examine the role of the
traditional price elasticity of import
demand, which cannot be derived by
Copeland and Taylor’s model, on the
changes of the pollution levels and
welfare.
To demonstrate the importance of
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demand, we derive that the real income
effect exists in the impacts of trade
liberalization in commodities and in
pollution permits on Southern and
worldwide pollution levels.  Since
pollution quality is a normal good,
Southern and worldwide pollution levels
fall if the real income goes higher.  We
show that the smaller the elasticity is, the
larger the impact of trade liberalization on
the terms of trade is.  The elasticity can
affect Southern and Northern welfare (i.e.,
real income) via the terms-of-trade effect.
Therefore, the elasticity can in turn
change Southern and worldwide pollution
levels through changing real income.
Accordingly, the paper’s focus is thus on
how the price elasticity of import demand
affects the pollution levels and welfare.
三、結果與討論
We consider a standard two-country,
two-good, general-equilibrium trade
model with a dual approach, and modify
it to allow for pollution.  There are two
countries: the highly-developed North and
the less-developed South. Northern
variables are indicated by an asterisk (*).
Each country consists of two industries:
the dirtier good, X1, and the cleaner good,
X2. South exports the dirtier product, and
North exports the cleaner product.  Good
X1 is chosen as a numeraire.  Pollution is
modeled as a by-product of goods
production. It is assumed that pollution
is a pure public bad. Pollution adversely
affects the consumers’ utility no matter
where they live, but it does not generate
external effects to production functions.
Suppose that the utility function
takes the form of U (C1, C2, ZW), which is
a function of good Xi’s consumption, Ci,
and worldwide pollution levels ZW.  This
means that pollution is a pure public bad.
Equivalently, the consumer’s preferences
can be represented with an expenditure
function E (P, ZW, u), which is derived by
E (P, ZW, u) = min. {C1+PC2: U (C1, C2,
ZW) ³ u}.  Function E is the minimum
cost of attaining utility level u, given the
price ratio P and worldwide pollution
levels.  Moreover, E is concave in P,
non-decreasing in P, and increasing in u.
As is the convention in international
trade literature, the private sector
maximizes the country’s national income.
This yields a GNP function G (P, s),
which is obtained from G (P, s, v) = max.
{X1+PX2 – s Z: (X1, X2, Z) Î T (v)}, where
Xi is the output of good Xi, s denotes the
pollution-permit price, Z represents
Southern pollution levels, T is the
production transformation function, and v
denotes the endowments of inputs vector.
Function G (P, s) is the maximum value
of national income, given production
technology T and factor endowments v.
This function, G, satisfies the standard
properties of a restricted profit function,
and is convex in (p, s).
In the beginning, we assume that the
South imposes a quota restriction to her
commodity imports, whereas there is no
international trade in pollution permits.
The South’s consumer expenditure equals
the net value of output plus pollution tax
and quota rents, which are collected by
the Southern government through the
auctioning off of import licenses and
through the consumer rebate.  The
definition of the North’s consumer
expenditure is the same as that for the
South except that the commodity quota
rents are replaced by the pollution-permit
quota rents.  Thus, Southern and
Northern budget constraints are,
respectively, expressed as:
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where Q denotes the commodity import
quotas imposed by the Southern
government; Qz represents the import
quotas of pollution permits set by the
Northern government.  Initially, Qz
equals zero due to the assumption that
there is no international trade in pollution
permits in the beginning.  Northern
pollution levels Z* are assumed to be
fixed in compliance with the restriction
set by the Kyoto Protocol.  The left-hand
side (LHS) of (1) and (2) represents the
country’s total expenditure, while the
right-hand side (RHS) denotes the
country’s aggregate income.
Worldwide pollution levels can be
obtained from aggregating the pollution
levels in the North and South. This can be
expressed as
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The Southern government’s
problem is to choose an optimal amount
of pollution levels to maximize her
welfare, taking as given consumer and
producer behavior.  We assume that the
Southern government treats the terms of
trade as given when choosing her
environmental policy.  Thus,
maximizing the Southern utility level with
respect to pollution permits, and treating
the terms of trade as given, yields:
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where Ez º ¶E/¶Zw represents the direct
marginal pollution damage to Southern
consumers caused by pollution.  The
optimal condition requires that the
government set the pollution tax equal to
the direct marginal pollution damage to
consumers caused by pollution.
By the envelope theorem, the
equilibrium condition for Northern and
Southern pollution permits requires that
the domestic demand for pollution
permits be equal to supply:
),,( sPGQZ sz -=-        (5)
),,( **** sPGQZ sz -=+           (6)
where -Gs º -¶ G/¶ s denotes the demand
for Southern pollution permits.  The
LHS of (5) and (6) denote the net supply
of pollution permits, which equal the
pollution amount set by the government
minus (plus) the exported (imported)
pollution permits.  The RHS represent
the demand for pollution permits.
Since we assume that there is a
quota restriction to Southern imports, the
equilibrium condition for good X2 requires
that domestic demand be equal to its
supply.  This can be described as:
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where Ep º ¶E/¶P denotes the consumer’s
compensated demand function.  The
LHS of (7) and (8) is the demand for good
X2 in each country.  The RHS of (7) and
(8) represents the net supply of good X2,
which equals its domestic output GP plus
(minus) imports (exports).  Thus, (7) and
(8) constitute the market-clearing
conditions for good X2.  By Walras’s law,
the market of good X1 is also cleared.
Note that the budget constraints along
with the market-clearing conditions imply
balanced trade for both countries.
With the aid of the above model, we
obtain the following results.  By
introducing the global pollution agreement,
this paper has examined the impacts on
pollution levels and welfare from trade
liberalization in commodities and in
pollution permits.  The focus of this
paper has been the real income effect in
determining Southern and global pollution
levels.  We show that the price elasticity
of Northern import demand is the crucial
factor in the real income effect.
Moreover, this elasticity can affect
Northern and Southern welfare via
5changing the terms-of-trade effect,
because this elasticity is the main factor to
the terms-of-trade effect.
By assuming that the Southern
exportable good is pollution intensive, we
obtain several striking results.  First of
all, unlike the argument asserted by
Copeland and Taylor (1995) as well as
environmentalists - that, is trade
liberalization in commodities will raise
worldwide pollution levels - we show that
trade liberalization does not necessarily
increase worldwide pollution levels.  The
levels may decrease if the price elasticity
of Northern import demand and the price
distortion caused by the import quota are
sufficiently large.  Secondly, Southern
welfare worsens if this elasticity is
sufficiently small, whereas Northern
welfare improves if the elasticity and the
price distortion caused by the import
quota are sufficiently large.  Thirdly,
allowing international trade in pollution
permits does not necessarily lower
Southern and worldwide pollution levels.
These levels rise if the price elasticity of
Northern import demand is sufficiently
large.  Furthermore, since allowing
pollution permits to be tradable
internationally benefits Southern welfare,
we may conclude that the South will
benefit from the system of carbon trading.
However, its impact on Northern welfare
is ambiguous.
四、計畫成果自評
本計畫研究內容與原計畫完全相
符，達成所有的預期目標，研究成果適
合在學術期刊發表。此外，本文的主要
發現亦具政策參考價值。
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